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Objectives: Nosocomial outbreaks involve only a small number of cases and
limited baseline data. The present study proposes a method to detect the
nosocomial outbreaks caused by rare pathogens, exploiting score prediction
interval of a Poisson distribution.
Methods: The proposed method was applied to three empirical datasets of
nosocomial outbreaks in Japan: outbreaks of (1) multidrug-resistant Acineto-
bacter baumannii (n Z 46) from 2009 to 2010, (2) multidrug-resistant Pseudo-
monas aerginosa (n Z 18) from 2009 to 2010, and (3) Serratia marcescens
(n Z 226) from 1999 to 2000.
Results: The proposed method successfully detected all three outbreaks during
the first 2 months. Both the model-based and empirically derived threshold
values indicated that the nosocomial outbreak of rare infectious disease may be
declared upon diagnosis of index case(s), although the sensitivity and specificity
were highly variable.
Conclusion: The findings support the practical notion that, upon diagnosis of
index patient(s), one should immediately start the outbreak investigation of
nosocomial outbreak caused by a rare pathogen. The proposed score prediction
interval can permit easy computation of outbreak threshold in hospital settings
among healthcare experts.1. Introduction
Nosocomial infection refers to the infection event
within medical and healthcare facilities at which
medical services for some diseases or health conditionsted under the terms of the C
0) which permits unrestrict
roperly cited.
ase Control and Preventionare provided. The nosocomial infection is seen not only
among patients but also among patients’ relatives and
healthcare workers. Because medical and healthcare
facilities involve treatment of a wide spectrum of
diseases and thus patients tend to be vulnerable toreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
ed non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
. Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. All rights reserved.
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pathogen can often cause nosocomial infection, and
moreover, prior antibiotic treatment tends to induce
infections caused by antibiotic-resistant bacteria. The
nosocomial infection can occur regardless of the size of
healthcare facility, and technically it will never be
eliminated. However, the nosocomial infection can
sometimes influence the prognosis of patients, and so
healthcare experts are expected to control an outbreak
event by detecting it at the early stage. To investigate
and understand the epidemiology of any nosocomial
outbreaks, epidemiological surveillance would play
a key role [1]. In Japan, the Ministry of Health, Labour,
and Welfare has conducted a routine surveillance
program of nosocomial infection [2], and each medical
facility with an independent clinical laboratory section
maintains the system of infectious agent surveillance
report through the isolation of causative pathogens from
patients’ samples. Given such a system, it is fruitful to
fully utilize the information, in particular, by detecting
any outbreak during the early stage.
To analyze the community-based surveillance data,
various statistical and epidemiological studies on the
early detection of community outbreaks have been
conducted. Farrington and Andrews [3] comprehen-
sively reviewed representative detection methods for the
investigation of the temporal or spatiotemporal inci-
dence data of infectious diseases. In addition to classical
statistical modeling approaches, hypothesis testing
method for detecting clusters of cases using an objective
novel statistic has also been developed [4]. The so-
called “scan statistic” has been used for detecting
spatiotemporal spread, and substantial revisions and
improvements have been made to detect the clusters
using a variety of data types [5,6]. Moreover, rather than
relying on case data with confirmed diagnosis, event-
based surveillance or the so-called syndromic surveil-
lance has also been explored for the sake of early
detection [7].
Nevertheless, the majority of existing study requires
us to have historical baseline data for the long time
period in order to define an “abnormality” in the data. In
other words, to extrapolate a statistical model with trend
and seasonality or to employ a time-series technique to
analyze the infectious disease data, having sufficient
long time-series data in the past would be essential to
form the baseline. This condition does not always hold
for nosocomial outbreaks caused by rare pathogens.
Moreover, except for the detection method of clustering,
existing published methods tend to be focused on
community-based surveillance data and thus are not
always directly applicable to detecting small outbreaks.
That is, the issue of early detection of nosocomial
outbreaks caused by rare pathogens without substantial
baseline incidence has yet to be discussed in a scientifi-
cally rigorous manner. The present study aims to
propose a simple method for detecting small nosocomialoutbreaks caused by rare pathogens, applying it to actual
outbreak datasets and assessing the validity of detection.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Observed data and motivation
To clearly demonstrate the study motivation, the
observed epidemic curves of three nosocomial outbreaks
are presented in Figure 1. The outbreak data were
retrieved from openly published case notification
reports. Figure 1A shows the monthly incidence of
multidrug resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (MDR-
AB) in a tertiary hospital with approximately 1150 beds
(n Z 46) from 2009 to 2010. While Acinetobacter
baumannii is broadly distributed in the environment, its
nosocomial infection is known to easily spread from
person to person, and thus it is hard to control without
substantial effort [8]. Within healthcare facilities, the
infection is frequently seen among patients who are
intubated for respiratory support, and MDR-AB is
known as a key factor to exacerbate respiratory function
and elevate the risk of death [8,9]. Figure 1B shows an
epidemic curve of a nosocomial outbreak caused by
multidrug resistant Pseuedomonas aeruginosa (MDRP)
at a secondary hospital with approximately 580 beds
(n Z 18) from 2009 to 2010. MDRP is frequently iso-
lated from patients staying for the long time and also
those requiring surgical management or antibiotic
treatment [10]. The extent of transmission is sometimes
a single ward scale (e.g., through contaminated hand-
washing basin), worsening clinical course of infected
patients in that particular ward [11]. Figure 1C and D
show the monthly counts of Serratia marcescens isola-
tions (nZ 226), counting the total samples and isolates
only from blood samples at a secondary hospital with
380 beds from 1999 to 2000. Although the isolation of
Serratia marcescens has not been rare in this hospital for
the long time, especially when we count the total
samples (Figure 1C), an abrupt increase in severe cases
was observed from May to June 2000 with eight fatal
outcomes. Separately counting the samples by anatom-
ical site, isolation from blood samples showed an
apparent increase in the corresponding period
(Figure 1D), and indeed, many severe cases had expe-
rienced septic shock before an outbreak investigation
was conducted. Serratia marcescens is commonly iso-
lated from the respiratory and urinary tracts of hospi-
talized adults and is responsible for catheter-associated
bacteremia, urinary tract infections and wound infec-
tions. All three diseases have greatly influenced the
prognosis of patients, indicating the importance of early
detection of the outbreaks and corresponding actions for
swift control. If the outbreak can be detected sufficiently
early, infected cases within a single ward may be
managed together, with particular care for the preven-
tion of further transmission events (e.g., admit and
manage cases in the same room) and moreover, nurses
Figure 1. Monthly incidence of nosocomial outbreaks. (A) Multidrug resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (MDR-AB) in a tertiary
hospital with approximately 1150 beds (nZ 46) from 2009 to 2010. (B) Multidrug resistant Pseuedomonas aeruginosa (MDRP) at
a secondary hospital with approximately 580 beds (n Z 18) from 2009 to 2010. (C) Total samples and (D) blood samples of
Serratia marcescens (nZ 226) at a secondary hospital with 380 beds from 1999 to 2000. The horizontal axis represents the month
of diagnosis. Before the observation in the earlier year (i.e., 2009 for A and B, and 1999 for C and D), there was no report of cases
since January.
Early detection of nosocomial outbreaks 123and other staffs responsible for infected cases may also
be limited to particular persons. In addition, doctors can
order additional laboratory testing of other suspicious
cases at the early stage, and respiratory function of
infected cases can be closely monitored.
In the present study, an outbreak is defined as the
occurrence of defined infectious disease cases clearly in
excess of the normal expectancy within a certain period of
time. This study attempts to detect the outbreak based on
monthly counts of cases using a statisticalmodel. In reality,
the detection does not have to rely solely on the temporal
data. Usually, additional insights are gained from contact
information and other risk-associated information (e.g.,
whether the infection is opportunistic or not), and also from
examining the spatiotemporal distribution of cases within
a hospital. Moreover, microbiological and clinical findings
(e.g., isolation of similar genotypes frommultiple patients)
can help demonstrate the transmission events. Among
these, the present study specifically focuses on the temporal
distribution for two reasons. First, the temporal data are
routinely collected evenwhen there is no outbreak. In other
words, the temporal counts of bacterial isolations or casenotifications would be readily available at any time, and
such a dataset should be effectively used for public health
purposes. Second, for a rare pathogen, even an occurrence
of a single casemay be regarded as an outbreak in practical
sense. Then, an outbreak defined by an occurrence of index
patient(s) does not practically require rigorous statistical
detection. However, issuing an alarm based on a single
diagnosis (or diagnosis of the first few cases) should ideally
rest on rigorous scientific grounds, and the present study
offers the theoretical basis examining the relevant condi-
tion at which one can declare the outbreak caused by rare
pathogens.
2.2. Outbreak and prediction interval
Here the outbreak detection is described by equa-
tions. To detect an outbreak based on the time series
data, the issue of epidemiological detection is conven-
tionally expressed as the hypothesis testing of “aberra-
tion” (i.e., if the observed data exceeds a defined
threshold) under a certain type I error [3]. That is, using
qU to define the upper bound for detecting an outbreak,
the observed data Y should satisfy
H. NishiuraPrðY > qU jno aberrationÞZa; ð1Þ
where a is the probability that normal observation is
incorrectly detected as an outbreak and may be inter-
preted as the risk of false positive alarms (e.g., one may
use a Z 0.025). The upper bound qU thus acts as the
reference value for detection, and this key value should
be calculated from the prediction interval, i.e., the ex-
pected range within which the population data in future
lies. The interpretation of the prediction interval
resembles that of the confidence interval (CI): the 95%
CI of a sample indicates the “range in which the pop-
ulation data lie at 95% probability,” while the 95%
prediction interval represents the range in which the
future population data, which cannot be observed at
present, lie at 95% probability based on observed data in
the past [12]. Let xZ{xi} be the sample monthly counts
of cases based on observation in month i (iZ 1,2,.,n)
for the length of n months, and let us consider the pre-
dicted number of cases y in (n þ 1)th month. Then, the
interval (L(x), U(x)) which satisfies
PrðLðxÞ  y UðxÞÞZ1 2a; ð2Þ
is referred to as the 100(1e2a)% prediction interval
(L(x), U(x)).
Among the published prediction intervals, the
simplest one may be based on an assumption that the
population data follow a normal distribution, and this
method was actually employed by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention and applied to various
practical settings [13]. Assuming that there is no trend in
the occurrence of cases, let the sample average and
sample standard error be x and s, respectively. The
100(1e2a)% prediction interval for (n þ 1)th month
given past observation for n months is 
x z1as
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 1
n
r
;xþ z1as
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 1
n
r !
; ð3Þ
where z1ea is the 100(1 e a) percentile of the standard
normal distribution (e.g., 1.96 for the 95% prediction
interval). Although detailed derivation process of (3) is
omitted here, this point is discussed in a variety of
literature on the interval estimation [13,14].
There are two technical problems in applying the
abovementioned prediction interval for three nosoco-
mial outbreaks in Figure 1. First, it is strictly not
appropriate to apply normal distribution to the datasets
with very small counts. Nevertheless, although the
prediction interval of continuous distributions tends to
be studied relatively well [15,16], that of discrete
distribution has not been often discussed, except for
normal approximations by means of the Wald method.
Second, the occurrence has been very uncommon due to
causation by rare pathogens, and thus, the baseline
information is extremely limited. Sometimes, the survey
starts only after confirming the diagnosis of index
patients.
1242.3. Statistical model
Since the occurrence is very rare with very small
number of observed cases, the present study ignores the
time trend (i.e., assumes stationary process) and employs
a Poisson distribution. The transmission dynamics of
infectious diseases are theoretically described by the
Poisson process, and the resulting number of cases with
time in an endemic equilibrium is known to follow
a Poisson distribution [17]. In the stationary state, there is
no increase or decrease in the number of cases (i.e., the
nonstationarity indicates the outbreak). Let X and Y be the
random variables representing the cumulative number of
cases for n months and the number of cases in (n þ 1)th
month. It is assumed that X follows a Poisson distribution
with an average Xn (where Xn is the observed sample
cumulative number), and also that the predicted value in
(n þ 1)th month similarly follows a Poisson distribution
with an average q. These satisfy the following equation:
qZ
Xn
n
: ð4Þ
To derive the prediction interval, we consider
a random variable W that represents the difference
between Y in (n þ 1)th month and predicted value X/n
for (n þ 1)th month (i.e., WZ Y e X/n). The average of
W is obtained from the averages of Y and X/n, i.e.,
mWZmY 
mX
n
Zq nq
n
Z0: ð5Þ
The variance of W is calculated as the sum of the
variances of Y and X/n:
s2WZs
2
Y þ
s2X
n2
Zqþ nq
n2
Zq

1þ 1
n

: ð6Þ
Standardizing W, we get
zZ
Y X=nﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
q

1þ 1
n
s : ð7Þ
Provided that q and Xn/n are sufficiently large, the
probability z asymptotically follows a normal distribu-
tion, and we obtain
z1aZ
Y Xn
nﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Xn
n

1þ 1
n
s : ð8Þ
As we compute the Wald CI, the 100(1 e 2a)%
prediction interval based on equation (8) is bYz1a
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Xn
n

1þ1
n
s
;bYþz1a
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Xn
n

1þ1
n
s !
; ð9Þ
where bY is equal to Xn/n in the range Xn > 0. If Xn is
zero (i.e., no occurrence in the past), an arbitrary small
Early detection of nosocomial outbreaks 125value, e.g., Xn Z 0.5, is conventionally adapted for the
computation [18]. The approximate prediction interval
(9) based on asymptotic normality is referred to as the
Nelson prediction interval [19]. It should be noted that
the coverage probability of the Wald CI for a normal
approximation to the binomial distribution is known to
be extremely small when the binomial probability is too
close to 0 or 1 [20]. In the case of approximate
prediction interval (9) for the Poisson distribution, the
coverage probability should also be small for small
number of observations, and thus, the applicability of
prediction interval (9) may be limited [21]. However,
the exact prediction interval is too complex for non-
experts, and moreover, the exact prediction interval of
discrete distribution is known not necessarily to yield
better coverage probability as compared to approximate
ones [20].
Hence, a score prediction interval, which is relevant to
Wilson score CI that yields much better coverage proba-
bility than the Wald method in equation (9), is derived.
The score prediction interval of a binomial distribution
has been already proposed in a statistical study and pub-
lished elsewhere [22]. To derive the score prediction
interval of a Poisson distribution, let us consider a joint
sampling of X and Y, as if the predicted value of the
variance of W in equation (7) is qxy Z (XþY )/(nþ1).
Namely, we use the following quantity that asymptoti-
cally follows a normal distribution:
z1aZ
Y Xn
nﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Xn þ Y
nþ 1

1þ 1
n
s : ð10Þ
As mentioned above, no occurrence in the past with
Xn Z 0 is replaced by Xn Z 0.5. The score prediction
interval is derived from taking the square of both sides
of equation (10) and solving it for Y as a quadratic
equation of Y [20,23]. Thus, the 100(1 e 2a)% predic-
tion interval is calculated as: 
Xn
n
þ z
2
1a
2n
 z1a
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
z21a
4n2
þXn
n2
þXn
n
r
;
Xn
n
þ z
2
1a
2n
þ z1a
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
z21a
4n2
þXn
n2
þXn
n
r !
: ð11Þ
2.4. Application to nosocomial outbreak data
Using the prediction interval (11), the early detection
was attempted for the observed three nosocomial
outbreaks. For all three outbreaks, the hospital surveil-
lance had been routinely conducted before the outbreak,
and the baseline data were available from January of the
corresponding earlier year of observation. As mentioned
above, as long as the number of reports in the past
remains zero, theoretical cumulative number Xn Z 0.5was used for the computation of the prediction interval.
The 1st month at which the observed number exceeded
the upper 95% prediction interval was regarded as the
month of successful detection.
Subsequently, the detection performance was assessed
by employing the receiver operating characteristic curve,
which was used for identifying an empirically defined
optimal cutoff point to define an outbreak, especially by
referring to the Youden index (i.e., sensitivity plus spec-
ificity minus 1) [24]. The period of outbreak was defined
to be from the 1st month to the last monthwith reporting of
at least one case: August 2009 to August 2010 for MDR-
AB, May 2009 to March 2010 for MDRP and MayeJune
2000 for Serratia (although a few earlier cases occurred in
summer 1999, they were not clinically serious and were
separated from the 2000 outbreak). Using the optimal
threshold of monthly case counts, the sensitivity and
specificity of outbreak detection were estimated. The
95% CIs of the sensitivity and specificity were computed
using normal approximation to the binomial distribution,
and similarly, the calculation of the 95% CI of the area
under the curve (AUC) was made using the Wald method
by means of logit transformation of the AUC.3. Results
Figure 2 compares observed and predicted values along
with the upper 95% prediction intervals for all three
outbreaks. The observed number of cases initially excee-
ded (and thus, the outbreak was detected) in the 1st month
(August 2009) forMDR-AB and the 2nd month forMDRP
(June, 2009) and sepsis caused by Serratia marcescens
(June, 2000). The calculated upper 95% prediction inter-
vals for these months were 0.97, 1.62, and 1.64 cases for
MDR-AB, MDRP, and Serratia, respectively. That is, if
we round up the thresholds to the next integer, the
proposed method suggests that one should use the cutoff
number of 1, 2, and 2 cases to define the outbreak caused
by the rare pathogens. If we round down the threshold
values that are 1 or greater, all the cutoff values would
suggest one case to define the nosocomial outbreak.
Empirical optimal threshold was also estimated to be
one case for all three outbreaks. However, the AUC
varied by outbreak and were estimated to be 100%,
78.1% (95% CI, 53.7e91.7), and 87.5% (95% CI,
26.4e99.3) for MDR-AB, MDRP, and Serratia,
respectively. Since there was no month with zero report
during the outbreak of MDR-AB, both the sensitivity
and specificity were estimated at 100%. As for MDRP,
the specificity was 100%, but the sensitivity was
calculated at 56.3% (95% CI, 37.5e81.3%) due to
several zero reports during the course of the outbreak.
With respect to Serratia marcescens, the sensitivity was
100%, but the specificity was 60.0% (95% CI,
30.0e90.0%) due to a few isolation reports from blood
samples before the outbreak.
Figure 2. Early detection of three nosocomial outbreaks. (A) Multidrug resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (MDR-AB).
(B) Multidrug resistant Pseuedomonas aeruginosa (MDRP). (C). Isolation of Serratia marcescens from blood samples. Filled
circles represent the observed monthly counts of cases. Straight line represents the expected value based on historical baseline, and
dashed line represents the upper 95% prediction interval to define an outbreak. In each panel, an arrow represents the 1st month at
which the outbreak is successfully detected.
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The present study proposed the score prediction
interval for detecting nosocomial outbreaks caused by
rare pathogens, applying the method to three actual
outbreak events in Japan, caused by MDR-AB, MDRP
and Serratia marcescens. The proposed approach is
regarded as an extension of a classical method invented
by Stroup et al [13], which employed a normal distri-
bution with a static baseline, in that the nonhomogeneity
(i.e., the outbreak) in the proposed approach can be
identified even for rare diseases with very small number
of counts for the baseline as it exploits a Poisson
distribution. In all three outbreaks, the threshold to
define the outbreak was computed to be one or two
cases, which agreed well with empirically calculated
threshold based on the receiver operating characteristic
curve and Youden index. These findings support the
notion that one should immediately start the outbreak
investigation of any nosocomial outbreak caused by rare
pathogens upon diagnosis of index patient(s).
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the present
study is the first to epidemiologically support the notion
that the nosocomial outbreak caused by rare pathogens
should be regarded as an outbreak even when there is
only one case. Based on the single report of index case,
the hospital may issue an alert. Although declaring an
outbreak and starting the investigation and interventions
with one case can easily be justified in practice, the
present study has offered a firm theoretical support for
that action and demonstrated its scientific validity.
However, the performances of outbreak detection (e.g.,
sensitivity, specificity, and AUC) were not shown to be
always excellent, because of the nature of using
threshold at one case, with highly variable sensitivity
and specificity values. However, the imperfect perfor-
mance of detection when using the defined thresholdshould not be regarded as a flaw of the proposed model,
but rather the nature of reliance on the temporal distri-
bution of cases. In reality, the declaration of outbreak
can also account for additional information such as
spatiotemporal growth of cases, the times of admission
and illness onset among cases, and identification of risk
factors through outbreak investigations.
An advantage of using score prediction interval is
that the coverage probability is much higher than other
approximate prediction intervals proposed in the past
[19,21,25,26]. Moreover, the present study has shown
that the analytical solution remains to be tractable, and
the proposed score prediction interval permits easy
computation in hospital settings among healthcare
workers using spreadsheet program. Given a ward-based
surveillance data for n months with cumulative counts
Xn, and given that we wish to test if there is an outbreak
within the ward, one can satisfy this task by comparing
the observed counts in (n þ 1)th month against
qUZ
Xn
n
þ ð1:96Þ
2
2n
þ 1:96
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1:96Þ2
4n2
þXn
n2
þXn
n
s
; ð12Þ
and, if the observed data exceeds the threshold, the
hospital ward may regard it as an abnormal excess. Due
to its simplicity, equation (12) has a potential to greatly
help any local clinical setting (including clinical labo-
ratory section) to issue an alarm of excess without
devising any complex computer system. In fact, it is
known that the isolation of MDR-AB in the laboratory
section was not sufficiently informed to infection control
team during the MDR-AB outbreak in Figure 1A during
its early stage, and using equation (12) among clinical or
laboratory experts should have at least helped recognize
the abnormality.
Although there have been a number of studies aiming
to detect infectious disease outbreaks employing a variety
of sophisticated mathematical and statistical techniques,
Early detection of nosocomial outbreaks 127not so many detection systems have been put into prac-
tice, especially at the levels of local medical and health-
care facilities. In particular, early detection approach to
small scale outbreaks such as nosocomial ones has been
extremely limited. In this sense, I believe that equation
(12) based on the proposed method and scientific support
to issue an alarm upon diagnosis of index patient(s) would
greatly help in managing nosocomial outbreaks at the
hospital- and ward-levels in the future.
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